In an earlier post I wrote some initial thoughts around postmodernism and its role in mediatised and global cultures. I want to return to those concepts in this post, and address some of the more complex philosophical concepts around the postmodern that arose in the seminar with Dr. Andrew Westerside.
I began writing previously about the way in which the postmodern aesthetic thows epistemological certainty – the sense that I know that I know what I know – into doubt, by inherently critiquing, and to some extent disproving, the certainty of parts and wholes. I drew some examples that we discussed in the seminar: that my arm is a whole in itself but also at once a part of my body, or that the individual stripes of a tricolour such as the French or German flags are wholes in themselves, but also and alternatively parts of the flag in its whole and also part of the whole of a symbolic register, for instance the symbolism of ‘red’ or ‘black’. The ideas I will write about here extend from this uncertainty about wholes and parts, and build on my earlier more basic notes on the artistic and philosophical postmodern.
“Portrait of Immanuel Kant”
author unknown
circa 18th century
medium unkown
Immanuel Kant’s ‘synthesis of the manifold’ theory is an interesting example of a postmodern philosophical outlook. His theoretical description of the synthesis of ideas as “the act of putting different representations together, and grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition” (Kant, 1987, 77) supports the postmodern idea: Kant suggests that our illusion of a coherent, unified world (one of the grand narratives that underpinned the modernist outlook) is in fact only a combination of many discrete and differing representations which we combine (perhaps crudely) to create an illusion of the world as a whole. Kant’s description identifies how the construction of grand narratives which ‘explain’ the world can be theorised, and when interrogated through the postmodern and the epistemological uncertainty which characterises it, Kant’s description of the synthesis of concepts into grand narratives can be shown to be merely an illusion.
In René Descartes’ Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, first published in 1637, the famous theory cogito ergo sum – “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes, 2014) – suggests that the act of thinking is the thing which confirms the ultimate existence of the self. The idea therefore that the self is rendered ‘real’ through the act of thought rather than through physical existence is expanded upon later in the text:
In the next place, I attentively examined what I was and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that ” I,” that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is.
(Descartes, 2014)
“Portrait of René Descartes”
by Frans Hals
circa 1649-1700
oil on canvas
Descartes suggests that the act and process of human thought can be simultaneously a confirmation of one’s existence within the realm of the ‘real’, and also proof of epistemological doubt: that is, if I can think, I can also doubt my existence; and yet, by doubting my own existence, I also undeniably exist. To doubt the self is the definition of being. Crudely summarised: “I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am, therefore I doubt”. This is a key example of the postmodern philosophy, in which epistemological doubt is taken and turned back upon itself. The grand narrative of the self becomes a shattered illusion, but in being shattered confirms that the self exists.
As a rationalist, Descartes’ arguments are solely concerned with what can be achieved with the powers of reason alone. He argues that nothing mediates the self – ‘I am given to myself directly’ – and that there is no distance between self and the understanding of self, his rationalist idea being that any act of thought is in itself an act of being. Postmodern thinkers suggested otherwise: that in fact we are ‘decentred’ from ourselves, and that by thinking about ourselves, we synthesise multiple discrete concepts (much as Kant suggests) in order to conceptualise ourselves and therefore think about ourselves. The postmodern argument is that in doing so, we act as mediators in our understanding of ourselves – and are so removed from ourselves in a way which ‘decentres’ us.
Judith Butler
provided by Butler to the University of California, Berkley
circa 2012-13
digital image
Epistemological uncertainty around the illusion of the whole, complete, certain ‘self’ is extended by feminist theory. Judith Butler’s writing suggests how there is no ‘gender claw’, no gender inside us which we are born with and which we express as a result of nature, but that isntead gender is something that we each perform; which we inscribue on and for ourselves, and upon the world, and in return the world inscribes it back on us. To support the postmodern philosophy, this idea of gender as ‘performed’ and therefore subjective, flexible and variable rejects the certainty of the modernist grand narrative of gender and instils further epistemological doubt.
These theories are all useful for exploring the philosophical applications of the postmodern system of thought, as it is characterised by doubt around the state of the world as it is, appears to us and is truly; doubt of the centrality of the self; doubt of knowledge and so forth.
Works cited
Descartes, R. (2014) Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking the Truth in the Sciences. University of Adelaide. Available from: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/d/descartes/rene/d44dm/complete.html [Accessed 7 November 2015].
Kant, I. (1987) Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. by P. Guyer and A. Wood. 1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.